It is straightforward to construct moment conditions for two-sided censored panel data regression models with strictly exogenous explanatory variables. The contribution of this note is to show that one set of these moment conditions uniquely identify the parameters of the model under a natural full-rank condition. The identi…cation result suggests an estimator that is then applied to evaluate the portfolio allocation e¤ect of a Danish tax reform that increased the after-tax capital income of bonds relative to stocks.
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In a panel data setting, the speci…c model is y it = x 0 it + " it y it = 8 < : a 1 if y it < a 1 y it if a 1 y it a 2 a 2 if y it > a 2
( 1) where " it is stationary conditional on (x i1 ; :::; x iT ). This has the usual …xed e¤ects speci…cation with strictly exogenous regressors as a special case, because it is not required that the mean of " it
given (x i1 ; :::; x iT ) be constant across individuals. When y it is a share, a 1 and a 2 will typically be 0 and 1, respectively. Honoré (1992) constructed moment conditions for a similar model with one-sided censoring and showed how they can be interpreted as the …rst-order conditions for a population minimization problem that uniquely identi…es the parameter vector, . It is straightforward to modify the moment conditions in Honoré (1992) so that they apply to the case with two-sided censoring. The contribution of this note is to show that some of those moment conditions can be turned into a minimization problem that identi…es . Since Honoré and Powell (1994) used the moment conditions in Honoré (1992) to construct an estimator for the one-sided censored regression model, it follows immediately how one would modify their estimator to cover the case of two-sided censoring. Since the main contribution of the paper is identi…cation, we will focus on the case where there are two time periods, so T = 2. With more than two time periods, one could use all pairs of periods as in Honoré and Kyriazidou (2000) .
We also illustrate that one can modify the estimator for a cross-sectional censored regression model with symmetric errors proposed by Powell (1986) to allow for two-sided censoring. This is of less practical relevance, as it is obvious how one would estimate such a model by median regression techniques like the ones in Powell (1984) and Khan and Tamer (2008) . Moreover, Powell (1986) already showed how to deal with censoring in one tail and truncation in the other. Zhang and Li (1996) considered estimation of the two-sided censored regression model with independent errors.
In section 5 we apply the estimator developed in section 3 to analyze the portfolio-reshu-ing e¤ect of a tax reform that increased the after-tax capital income on bonds relative to stocks in Denmark after 1987.
Identi…cation
The key result is Lemma 2 below. The following notation is useful.. For a 1 a 2 , de…ne mami fa 1 ; x; a 2 g = 8 <
:
x > a 2 so (1) can be written as
In order to simplify the exposition, we will develop the case when a 1 = 0 and a 2 = 1. It is then straightforward to adapt the result to the general case.
As mentioned in the introduction, it is straightforward to construct moment conditions that must be satis…ed at the true . Consider an individual, i, in two time periods, t and s. The distribution of y it x 0 it will be the same as that of " it except that the former is censored from below at x 0 it and from above at 1 x 0 it . Figure 1 illustrates this. The dotted line depicts the distribution of " it , while the solid line gives the distribution of y it x 0 it , which typically has point mass at x 0 it and 1 x 0 it (illustrated by the fatter vertical lines). Since x 0 it will typically di¤er from x 0 is , the distributions of y it x 0 it and y is x 0 is (given (x it ; x is )) will di¤er even if f" it g is stationary. However, it is clear that one could obtain identically distributed "residuals"by arti…cially censoring y it x 0 it and y is x 0 is from below at max f x 0 it ; x 0 is g and from above at min f1 x 0 it ; 1 x 0 is g. See the dashed lines in Figure 1 . One can then form moment conditions from the fact that the di¤erence in these "re-censored"residuals will be orthogonal to functions of (x it ; x is ). 1 The contribution here is to show that some of these moment conditions uniquely identify the parameter vector .
It is useful to de…ne functions u 1 (y 1 ; ) and u 2 (y 2 ; ) over the interval 1 to 1 as follows
With these de…nitions, u 1 (y it ; x 0 it x 0 is ) u 2 (y is ; x 0 it x 0 is ) will give the di¤erence in the recensored residuals discussed above. To see this, suppose that x 0 it x 0 is . Then the di¤erence in the arti…cially censored residuals for individual i in periods t and s is
Also de…ne function r 1 (y 1 ; ) and r 2 (y 2 ; ) over the interval 1 to 1 as
The functions r 1 (y 1 ; ) and r 2 (y 2 ; ) are constructed so their derivatives are u 1 (y 1 ; ) and u 2 (y 2 ; ), respectively.
Finally, de…ne
Lemma 2 Suppose y i1 = mami f0; + " i1 ; 1g and y i2 = mami f0; " i2 ; 1g
where " i1 and " i2 are identically distributed random variables with support on the whole real line.
Then arg max
Proof: See Appendix.
The following corollary follows immediately.
Corollary 3 Consider the model
for t = 1; 2. If " it is stationary conditional on (x i1 ; x i2 ) with support on the whole real line, then the set of solutions to
The implication of Corollary 3 is that is identi…ed provided that there is no other b such that
This is similar to "full rank"
conditions for semiparametric censored regression models.
As mentioned, the censoring points are not always 0 and 1. Suppose that
In that case
and the previous corollary then applies to the function
The censoring points can di¤er across observations provided that they are observed for all observations.
Estimation
When the censoring points are 0 and 1, the analog estimator based on the idea above is
where the w 0 i;t s 's are exogenous weights and T i is the number of observations for the i'th individual. 2 It follows immediately from textbook arguments that b is consistent and asymptotically normal under appropriate regularity conditions. The exact structure of the asymptotic covariance matrix depends on the assumptions made on the sampling scheme. Under random sampling (and suitable regularity conditions like the ones in Honoré (1992) ),
Following standard arguments, these are consistently estimated by
With unbalanced panels, one might want wi;t s to depend on Ti. For example, one can think of the usual …xed e¤ects estimator in a linear regression model as minimizing
A Gauss program for implementing the estimator can be found at http://www.princeton.edu/ honore/programs/2side/.
Powell' s Model
Powell (1986) studied the censored regression model
with
Following the line of argument above, it is easy to show that if (2) is changed to
Corollary 4 Consider the model
If " it is symmetrically distributed around 0 conditional on x i with support on the whole real line, then the set of solutions to
The analog estimator based on this is
As mentioned in the introduction, this is less interesting than the estimator for the panel data version, as it is obvious how one would estimate such a model by median regression techniques like the ones in Powell (1984) and Khan and Tamer (2008) . Moreover, Powell (1986) already showed how to deal with censoring in one tail and truncation in the other. Zhang and Li (1996) considered estimation of the two-sided censored regression model with independent errors.
Empirical Application
In this section we apply the estimator in Section 3 to analyze the portfolio-reshu-ing e¤ect of a tax reform that increased the after-tax capital income on bonds relative to stocks in Denmark in 1987.
We use a panel data set constructed from administrative records covering two years before and after the reform to estimate a portfolio share equation for bonds on marginal tax rates of capital income.
The analysis presented here follows the literature on taxation and portfolio structure, e.g., Feldstein
(1976), Hubbard (1985) , King and Leape (1998), Samwick (2000) , Poterba and Samwick (2002) and the survey by . These papers analyze (repeated) cross sections of households. 3
Here the analysis is extended by using panel data and controlling for time-invariant correlated heterogeneity, i.e., …xed e¤ects. Controlling for correlated unobserved …xed factors is likely to be important in this context, since the portfolio composition of a household is likely to be in ‡uenced by time-invariant factors such as risk aversion and time discounting.
3 Bakija (2000) uses the limited panel module of the American Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) to study portfolio changes around the 1988 tax reform. However, his data set is very small (984 households) and unrepresentative due to the well-known attrition problem in the SCF panel module; see Kennickell and Woodburn (1997) .
More important in this context, the estimators applied do not exploit the full potential of the panel data in handling unobserved heterogeneity. Ioannides (1992) also employs the 1983-1986 SCF panel module but does not control for unobserved heterogeneity.
In the next subsection we give a brief overview over the tax reform. After this, we introduce the data and present the results.
The Tax Reform
The tax reform, announced in 1985 and implemented in 1987, broke the link between the marginal tax rates on earned income and capital income. Before the reform, all income was taxed at the same marginal tax rate. With the reform the tax rate on positive capital income for high-income households was decreased from 73 percent to 56 percent. The reform thereby increased the aftertax return on interest-bearing assets and therefore encouraged households to shift their portfolios toward such assets. The reform also changed the tax value of interest deductions from 73 to about 50 percent, and this substantially increased the cost of debt, primarily mortgages, for leveraged high-income households. For such households the reform e¤ectively brought a negative wealth shock, giving them a strong incentive to lower their debt burden. 4 The exact changes, however, di¤ered across municipalities. The Danish income tax system is built around a proportional local government tax and a progressive tax collected by the central government. While the progressive schedule is the same for everybody in Denmark, the local government tax rates vary across municipalities. A tax ceiling, however, insured that the marginal tax rate could be at the maximum 73 percent. After the reform the tax ceiling on earned income was reduced to 68 percent in the highest bracket 5 and 56 percent in the middle bracket. Capital income was now taxed at the same rate independently of the level of earned income. The marginal tax rates across tax brackets before and after the reform are summarized in Table 1 (see Appendix 2)
The application of a tax ceiling together with the heterogeneous local government tax rates implies that the reform had di¤erential e¤ects on people living in di¤erent municipalities. percentage points. It is these di¤erences in changes of marginal tax rates that we will exploit for identifying the e¤ect of changes in marginal tax rates on the portfolio allocation when using the …xed e¤ects estimator.
The marginal tax rates on capital income refer to income received in the form of dividends on stocks and interest payments from interest bearing accounts and bonds. Both before and after the reform, realized capital gains/losses associated with trading assets were generally not taxed. The exemption from this rule is capital gains from corporate stocks held for less than three years. Such capital gains are taxed as earnings. Dividend payments were low relative to interest received from bonds. 6 This suggests that lowering the marginal tax rate on positive capital income a¤ected bonds and stocks di¤erentially, favoring mainly income from bonds. In the empirical analysis we therefore focus on reshu-ing between bonds and stocks.
Data
The data set is drawn from a random sample of 10 percent of the Danish population observed in the years 1984 to 1988. Information on portfolio allocations, income, wealth and demographics is collected and merged from di¤erent public administrative registers for all adult members of the household that the sampled person belongs to. Portfolio and income information is obtained from the income tax register. The portfolio information exists because Denmark had a wealth tax that required all wealth holdings to be reported to the tax authorities. This information allows us to break the wealth of each household into holdings of stocks and bonds. "Stocks" includes all holdings of publicly and privately traded stocks, and "bonds" includes government and corporate bonds. The holdings of stocks and bonds are self-reported through the tax return and then audited by the tax authority.
Sample selection
For our analysis we exclude observations if one of the household members is self-employed, since register data are not likely to contain a good measure of own business wealth and because taxable income is quite volatile for those individuals. Sampled individuals younger than 18 or older than 60 are dropped as are students and individuals living together with his/her parents or living in a common household, i.e., a household with more than one family. To keep the focus on the 6 The median household in the sample holding stocks received dividends corresponding to 2 percent of the value of the stocks. The median household in the sample holding bonds received interest payments from these corresponding to 10 percent of the value of the bonds.
importance of tax incentives, we include only stable couples, i.e., couples where the partner is the same in 1984 through 1988. On the same grounds we also exclude couples moving in the sample period. For the purpose of the analysis we require that households entering the sample be observed in all years in the period 1984-1988 so that we have a balanced panel.
Our objective is to investigate whether households reshu-e their portfolios in response to a change in tax incentives. As in most industrialized countries many Danish households have fairly undiversi…ed portfolios. Since the decrease in the value of interest deductions generated a large negative wealth shock, clearly, these households are not likely to engage in portfolio reshu-ing and hence cannot give us a clean answer regarding portfolio readjustments. We therefore construct a sub-sample of households holding positive amounts of stocks or bonds of at least 5,000 DKK in 1984. We also require households to hold a positive amount of either stocks or bonds throughout the rest of the observation period. This selection is introduced because we want to focus on households with a potential to reshu-e between stocks and bonds. Also renters are deselected because there are few renters with diversi…ed portfolios. 7 The …nal subsample includes 8,577 households. 8
Results
In this section we investigate if households reshu-ed their portfolio of bonds and stocks as a response to the changes in relative after-tax returns on assets brought about by the 1987 tax reform. To do this we employ the estimator presented above to estimate a portfolio share equation where the fraction of bonds in …nancial wealth, de…ned as the sum of bonds and stocks, is regressed on the marginal tax rate on positive capital income and some control variables.
The distinguishing feature of our data set is the panel dimension. This facilitates estimating portfolio share equations allowing for correlated unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity. This is important because we believe that unobserved time-constant factors, such as risk aversion and time preferences, are correlated with wealth. High risk aversion may, for example, lead to a higher portfolio share of safe assets, such as bonds, for a given level of wealth.
Before the reform, capital income and earnings were lumped together and taxed according to a progressive tax scheme. This implies that households choose their tax bracket when choosing their portfolio and that the marginal tax rate on capital income is likely to be an endogenous regressor.
7 For assessing portfolio reshu-ing renters could have been included. We have chosen to leave them out of this analysis because there are only a few renters (898) with positive …nancial wealth of at least 5000 DKK in 1984.
Moreover, renters generally do not provide a good comparison group for homeowners, since di¤erent preference parameters may govern their behavior.
8 See Alan and Leth-Petersen (2006) for a more detailed analysis.
We address this by calculating the marginal tax rate on capital income based on the household's income in 1984, the year before the reform was announced, but using current year rules. In this way the individual level tax bracket is allocated based on information that was predetermined relative to the portfolio response to the reform.
We regress portfolio shares on the marginal tax rate on positive capital income, the log of total …nancial assets, i.e., assets held in stocks and bonds, and a set of year dummies. Tax rate changes vary across municipalities, but most of the change in tax rates is common across municipalities.
Year dummies control for the e¤ect of this common part, thereby also removing the major part of the wealth e¤ect brought about by the reform. E¤ectively, by introducing year dummies, the coe¢ cients on marginal tax rates are identi…ed by di¤erences in changes of marginal tax rates.
Year dummies may also pick up common e¤ects relating to ‡uctuations in assets. Financial assets control for any remaining wealth e¤ect that might be present. 9 Table 2 of Appendix 2 presents the parameter estimates from estimating random e¤ects tobit and …xed e¤ects censored regression models for the portfolio share of bonds in …nancial wealth. The estimated parameter on the marginal tax rate is negative. 10 If year dummies and …nancial assets pick up the wealth e¤ect related to the reform, in particular the e¤ect of the reduction in the value of interest deduction that led households to liquidate …nancial assets, then this is exactly what economic theory predicts. Households should substitute from stocks toward bonds, whose relative after-tax return increased, and this is what the results indicate. Considering the corresponding random e¤ects estimates, we can see that the parameter estimates on …nancial assets and on year dummies are quite di¤erent, and the test of parameter equality between the random e¤ects and …xed e¤ects speci…cations rejects. 9 An alternative identi…cation strategy could be based on comparing the behavior of households in di¤erent tax brackets. Households in the lowest tax bracket faced only very small changes in marginal tax rates on capital income, and households in the middle tax bracket faced di¤erent changes in marginal tax rates than households in the highest tax bracket. In our case this is not a natural approach to follow. High-and low-income people are di¤erent in terms of wealth levels and portfolio composition and possibly di¤erent with respect to preference parameters such as the discount rate and the level of risk aversion. Households in lower tax brackets therefore do not represent a natural control group for high-income households.
Concluding Remarks
It is straightforward to construct moment conditions for linear panel data models with two-sided censoring. The contribution of this note is to show that one set of these moment conditions uniquely identify the parameters of the model under a natural full-rank condition. The main limitation is that the approach requires strictly exogenous explanatory variables. The methodological point of the empirical application is to show that the method is feasible in practice. The empirical …nding is that the conventional random e¤ects model is rejected and that some of the estimates are quite sensitive to whether one speci…es a random e¤ects or …xed e¤ects model. 
